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Abstract    
The “lemon” problem was initially posed by Nobel Prize winner Akerlof 
in his seminal article of 1970 and showed how a market with unbalanced 
information, called information asymmetry, can lead to complete disap-
pearance or to offerings with poor quality where bad products (lemons) 
wipe out the good ones. Empirical evidence for Akerlof‟s theory came 
originally from the market of used cars, where the lemon is a well known 
problem. However the theoretical model of the “lemon” problem has prov-
en also to be valid on other markets and in comparable situations like in-
ternal markets. The theory is also been used more and more in IS research 
especially since the emerging e-commerce initiatives and the continuous 
growth of e-markets and auctions. In this chapter we bring a description of 
the theory by presenting its nomological network and its linkages to other 
well known theories in IS research. The relevance for the theory is shown 
to explain phenomenon‟s in the IS discipline. An overview is given of cur-
rent and past IS articles using the Lemon Market theory (LMT) together 
with a bibliographical analysis of the references to the original Akerlof ar-
ticle.     
Keywords: Lemon Market, Information asymmetry, Adverse Selection, Moral 
Hazard, Trust. 
 
1 Introduction 
The market for “Lemons” is a popular expression for a wide spread eco-
nomic theory developed by Akerlof in his seminal paper of 1970 (Akerlof 
1970). According this theory there can be incentive for sellers to market 
poor quality resulting in a reduction of the average quality and leading to a 
death spiral with eventually a complete market deterioration. The pheno-
menon of a “lemon” market arises on markets where there is information 
asymmetry between buyer and seller and where the overall quality of 
goods and services offered is reflected to the entire group of sellers rather 
than on individual sellers. Lack of seller differentiation could force high-
quality sellers to flee the market because their quality and reputation can-
not be rewarded. Akerlof demonstrated his theory with examples from the 
used car market. Most of the empirical data for bringing evidence to the 
theory is coming from a used car market (Bond 1982). However the Lem-
on Market theory (LMT) is applied in a wide variety of similar market sit-
uations like electronic markets, wholesales automotive, and durable goods 
markets. LMT is predominantly applied in disciplines like economics, 
management, finance, and law. Although the LMT is well defined, its use 
in IS research is often vague and limited to a sole citation of the seminal 
article of the Nobel Prize winner Akerlof. Investigated phenomenon‟s in 
today‟s digital world by which the LMT is empirical tested are rather 
scarce. The strong ideas and explaining mechanisms in the theory are 
mostly taken for granted. Although the LMT is a grant theory with a lot of 
explanatory and generalizing power, its falsification and validity should be 
tested in every different empirical situation. However we can observe that 
the use of the LMT with empirical evidence in IS research is growing. The 
theory has surely gained attention in the strand of research on e-commerce 
with research topics like e-markets and auctions (Dewan and Hsu 2004, 
Pavlou and Gefen 2004, Lee et al 2010) 
1 Dissection of the theory: its nomological network and 
constructs 
The nomological network is a concept developed by Lee Cronbach and 
Paul Meehl in 1955 and is a graphical representation of a theory by means 
of his constructs and their causality relations (Cronbach and Meehl 1955). 
It is in essence a way of showing construct validity for the measures that 
are used to validate the theory. The nomological network includes the 
theoretical framework with the constructs, an empirical framework show-
ing how the constructs can be measured, and specification of the linkages 
between these two frameworks. In this work we only focus on the theoreti-
cal framework. Figure 1 shows our nomological theoretical network of the 
LMT.  
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Figure 1. The nomological network for the Lemon Market theory 
  
The level of analysis for the LMT is a market (external or internal) where 
two transacting parties meet. The parties can be firms or individuals. The 
basic independent construct for the LMT is information asymmetry. In-
formation asymmetry is a condition which is well understood and a very 
frequent occurring phenomenon in all sorts of human and organizational 
interactions (Stiglitz 2000). Since a situation of asymmetric information 
can emerge in several ways it is also well researched in a broad variety of 
situations. For example: insurance markets, management (shareholders 
versus management) (Chiang and Venkatesh 1988), organizational activi-
ties (Aboody and Lev 2000), professional expertises (doctor-patient, law-
yer-client) (Nayyar 1990) are different sources of information asymmetry. 
Information asymmetry engender strategic possibilities that can easily be 
modelled. The most generic way to do so is by applying game theory. This 
leads to capturing the richness of observations of real world phenome-
non‟s.   However there are some drawback by doing so. Milgrom and Ro-
berts (1987) point at two serious questions on the modelling of information 
asymmetry environments. First is the assumption that equilibrium beha-
viour will prevail and secondly the bounded rationality of the participating 
parties. This leads to models with less predicting power than explanatory 
power.   
We consider here two groups of transacting parties: buyers and sellers. The 
buyer is the less informed party and the seller is the most informed party. 
The transaction is considered to take place on a internal or external market. 
On a market a buyer interacts with a seller, and a contract or transaction is 
negotiated. Christozov et al. see information asymmetry as a natural prop-
erty of any communication process between a sender and a receiver, when 
both actors have different background and expertise, use different “jargon” 
or possess different information regarding the content of the communica-
tion session (Christozov et al. 2009). When there is information asymme-
try, the distribution of information between the transacting parties is unba-
lanced resulting in an imperfect market. Some authors refer to a situation 
of information asymmetry as a situation of imperfect information. This 
asymmetry can put one party at an advantage while placing the other at a 
disadvantage and makes the decision of a product risky for a prospective 
buyer (Afzal et al. 2009).  Information asymmetry depends on the different 
capabilities and intellectual levels of the transacting actors and is therefore 
considered as a independent construct for the LMT.  
Dependent constructs from information asymmetry are trust, adverse selec-
tion, and moral hazard. We discuss the three dependent constructs and 
their dependent constructs.  
The concept of trust is subtle, diffuse and elusive. Although there is 
agreement on the importance of trust there also appears disagreement on a 
suitable definition of the construct (Bigley and Pearce 1998). Trust is a de-
pendent construct and can be been seen as a co-ordinating mechanism 
based on shared moral values and norm supporting collective co-operation 
and collaboration within uncertain environments (Reed 2001). Trust is the 
degree to which one party has confidence in another within the context of a 
given prospect, decision or collaborative project. Blois gives a number of 
definitions of trust appearing in frequently quoted papers (Blois 1999). 
Trust/control relations between organizations can be seen as highly com-
plex structures of social relations and processes which are needed for the 
generation and maintenance of collective action. The concept of trust is 
crucial in business interactions that are characterized by mutual dependen-
cy combined by with a lack of mutual control. Some researchers argue that 
trust is also reciprocal. According to Reed: „[...] the essential character of 
all trust relations is their reciprocal nature. Trust tends to evoke trust, dis-
trust to evoke distrust.... As trust shrinks, distrust takes over.‟ (Reed 2001). 
The notion of trust is latent present in the seminal article of Akerlof as dis-
honesty. Information asymmetry may result in a misunderstanding or even 
erode existing trust between the participating actors.  
Trust is related to reputation. The concept of reputation is commonly used 
in social life and economy. Wilson defines reputation as: "a characteristic 
or attribute ascribed to one person (or organization) by another person (or 
organization)" (Wilson 1985). Reputation theory indicate that uncertainty 
about the seller‟s honesty will affect the buyers‟ behavior (Kreps and Wil-
son 1982). Reputation can be formed by means of ratings by different buy-
ers and can be seen as a measure that brings evidence a posteriori about the 
missed information or the hidden information and quality of the seller. 
When there is no proper reputation signaling mechanism on a market, 
there is incentive for a lemon market where it is preferable to offer low 
quality products and services (lemons) or no participation in the market at 
all in case of high quality sellers. In both cases the overall perceived quali-
ty is going down. According to Yamagishi and Matsuda (2002) reputation 
can provide an effective solution to the lemons problem when 1) it is 
shared by all or most traders in the market, 2) traders in fact base their be-
havior on it, and 3) the market is closed such that the trader who is ex-
cluded from it cannot find an alternative market.   
The adverse selection is the second dependent construct of information 
asymmetry and is the process of selecting the wrong seller and consequen-
tially the least product quality. Adverse selection is a pre-contractual con-
dition. Hidden information is sometimes used as a more practical term for 
the adverse selection.  From the buyers point of view there is lack of 
knowledge on the features of the product or service and the real capabili-
ties of the seller which may result in a wrong decision to select and leading 
to failure. From the seller‟s point of view a wrong selection may result in 
the buyer‟s dissatisfaction and eroding the reputation and consequently a 
drop of perceived quality.  
Moral hazard as the third dependent construct is a post-contractual condi-
tion and can arise from the seller‟s fraud or incapacity to deliver the real 
quality of the offering. Hidden action or hidden intention are sometimes 
used as more practical terms for moral hazard, although we see these terms 
more as metrics for opportunistic behavior which can arise from moral ha-
zard. We take the moral hazard construct into account because even if the 
problem of adverse selection is overcome by selecting a good seller with 
fair quality offerings, post contractually the seller may start to shrink on 
quality. This can be the case on markets where service offering are traded. 
For IS moral hazard happens when a the seller can gamble on a so called 
vendor lock, in which the buyer is confronted with high switching costs 
and forced to use the services of the existing IS vendor. Opportunistic be-
havior can erode reputation and leading to a drop of perceived quality.   
A lemon market must be seen as a dynamic process involving positive and 
negative feedback coming from closed transactions. Like a cybernetic sys-
tem negative feedback can stop a market becoming a lemon market and 
eventually stop the death spiral. Positive feedback enforces the lemon 
market dynamics which drives the good ones out of the market and accele-
rates the death spiral. New entrants can enter the market and eventually 
stop the spiral. This can also be done by better informed buyers or more 
honesty sellers. The market mechanism can eventually be regulated by ex-
ogenous triggers like governmental corrective initiatives.     
For a market to become a lemon market there are constraints and an ignit-
ing condition is needed. The constraints for obtaining a lemon market are: 
1) information asymmetry, a condition in which not all relevant informa-
tion is known to all parties involved so prospective buyers can not accu-
rately assess the value of a product or service before sale is made and sel-
lers can more accurately assess the value of a product or service prior to 
sale, 2) Sellers have no credible ways of disclosing the real quality to buy-
ers, 3) the seller‟s quality is assessed by buyers acting as von Neumann-
Morgenstein maximizers of expected utility. The igniting condition for a 
lemon market is that an incentive exists for the seller to market low quality 
products and services.  
All parties participating in the communication process would benefit heav-
ily from reducing information asymmetry and avoiding a lemon market. 
Quantifying the amount of information asymmetry in a communication 
process is not easy. It also not straightforward to derive the amount of risk 
of misinforming, moral hazard and adverse selection.   
3 Link with other theories 
The attraction of the LMT comes from its high level of abstraction and his 
power to make strong generalizations. The theory is also applicable in oth-
er disciplines beside economics. It may come as no surprise that LMT is 
also used in IS research. Since its inception in 1970 this discipline has  es-
tablished a new field that comprise computer science, economics, engi-
neering, organizational science, managerial science, operational research, 
business and information science. According to Gregor all IS theories gain 
only meaning in an objectivity existing in an abstract world of man-made 
entities (Gregor, 2006). We believe this holds also for the LMT. The LMT 
is mainly an explanatory theory although it contains also causality and the 
power to make generalizations. Besides this, LMT also encompasses ideas 
that provide ways to think about other more or less related theories. In our 
research we found that Agency Theory (Jensen and Mecklin 1976), Pros-
pect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), and Organisational Trust 
Theory (Reed 2001) are closely related to LMT. We already discussed the 
nature of trust in the previous paragraph. The research on trust in Internet 
related issues like fraud, e-auctions and e-markets and the relation with a 
the lemon problem is numerous (Grazioli and Jarvenpaa 2000, Ba and Pav-
lou 2002, Pavlou and Gefen 2004, Pavlou and Dimoka 2006, Eymann et 
al. 2008, Hoffman et al. 2009). We briefly discuss here Agency and Pros-
pect theory and their relations with the LMT.    
Agency theory is central to Western management thinking and one of the 
cornerstones for the theory of the firm (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The 
(positivistic) agency theory is a well-known theory, largely used in the 
strand of research on IS and outsourcing (Dibbern et al. 2004). According 
to Pavlou et al. the LMT can be seen as an extension of the principal-agent 
perspective to markets of imperfect information (Pavlou et al. 2007). Be-
sides asymmetric information and goal differences, there is an important 
third factor in agency problems: risk behavior differences. For example the 
implementation of an IS is highly risky since the outcome is not always 
stated in measurable outputs and only partly verifiable by organization 
members. The likelihood of failure looms large because of this outcome 
uncertainty. This gives rise to an entrepreneurial risk situated initially with 
the principal. The transfer of that risk to the agent is not straightforward 
since both parties‟ express risk behavior differences. The principal is as-
sumed risk neutral and the agent risk averse. This assumption is based on 
the argument „[…] that agents are unable to diversify their employment 
[…] and principals, who are capable of diversifying their investments, 
should be risk neutral.‟ (Eisenhardt 1989). However it is assumed that the 
principal is risk averse when choosing for a “buy” option (Eisenhardt 
1989). When principals are faced with adverse possibilities there is an 
overweighting of certainty (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). This is where 
the prospect theory give some explanation.  
Prospect theory (PT) was developed by Tversky and Kahneman (Kahne-
man and Tversky 1989; Tversky and Kahneman 1986) as a falsification for 
the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) of Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(Currim and Sarin 1989).  PT has also been used in IS research (Koh et al. 
2004; Rose and Rose 2004). It is our belief that on the issue of risk beha-
vior differences the prospect theory is of special interest (Devos et al. 
2008). Okada (2010) investigated the link between uncertainty, risk aver-
sion and the seller‟s willingness to accept (WTA) versus the buyer‟s wil-
lingness to pay (WTP). They drawn on prospect theory to demonstrate that 
the discrepancy between the WTA and WTP increases with 1) the level of 
uncertainty about the exchange item‟s value and 2) the exchange parties„ 
level of risk aversion.  
The links of the LMT with the three mentioned theories are presented in 
figure 2. All four theories share the construct information asymmetry. 
LMT and Agency theory share the constructs moral hazard, opportunistic 
behavior and adverse selection. Adverse selection is also shared by PT. 
Reputation is shared by LMT and Trust theory.  
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Figure 2. The links of  the Lemon Market theory with Agency theory, Prospect theory and 
Trust theory.  
 
There are however other theories who have shared constructs with LMT 
like auction theory, game theory and incomplete contract theory. Incom-
plete Contract Theory (ICT) formalise some ideas on opportunistic beha-
viour in the present of a risky investment between transacting parties.  The 
theory was developed in the late 1980s by Hart and Moore (1988). Auction 
Theory (AT) provides explanation for market mechanisms like methods of 
price formation in environments with incomplete information. (Klemperer  
1999). AT has gained a lot of interest in developing new auction forms like 
sell radio spectrum licences and set up new e-markets.  The most generic 
theory which relates to LMT is probably game theory (GT). Markets can 
easily be simulated in well-defined economic environments (symmetric vs 
asymmetric information) where they provide valuable testing grounds for 
GT (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944).    
4 Literature Overview of IS articles using LMT 
Although a lot of IS scholars refer to the phenomenon of a lemon market 
in a variety of situations there is not a lot of research bringing empirical 
evidence of an actually lemon market as predicted by Akerlof. It is even 
unclear in some work to see how the theory is actually applied to explain 
the observations. The reference to the seminal paper of Akerlof seems to 
be reduced to only a citation. Some examples: 
...[]We can, therefore, defer consideration of the „lemon‟ problem asso-
ciated with quality under asymmetric information. (Liao and Cheung 
2002) 
...[]Eventually, only the lowest-quality sellers would remain, a dynamic 
economist George Akerlof memorialized as the “market for lemons”. 
(Resnick et al 2000) 
Some articles only have the seminal article of Akerlof as an entry in the 
reference list without further use in their work (Kambil and Ginsburg 
1998; de Figueiredo 2000; Sakalaki and Kazi 2009).   
The basic construct of the LMT, information asymmetry is actually well 
researched. This was shown on Internet exchanges for used goods like 
PDAs, digital cameras, audio players and laptops (Ghose 2009). Informa-
tion asymmetry between buyer and seller creates the possibility of igniting 
a lemon market but is certainly not a sufficient condition. On an individual 
level, signs of the lemon market are mainly measured by adverse selection 
(Dewan and Hsu 2004). Afzal et al. (2009) showed that symmetric infor-
mation highly valued a product in close proximity to the real worth of the 
product, while asymmetric information undervalued a product. Lee et al 
(2010) showed that opportunistic behaviours in online markets can be pre-
dicted. As the risk of fraud increases, buyers underestimate the value of 
items in order to reduce the potential transaction risk. They conclude that 
this practice harms the honest and normal sellers and thus leading to a 
lemon market. To mitigate the lemon problem Lee and Yoo (2007) found 
that several auction markets have devised third party quality grading sys-
tems and limited auctions to only relatively higher quality products. Over-
by and Jap (2009) conducted an enquiry to investigate the adoption of e-
channels in a market for products of uncertain quality (used vehicles). 
They found that quality uncertainty causes buyers to discount as a hedge 
against buying a lemon.   
The market of IT security products and services seems to go in the direc-
tion of a lemon market. Since the security of software products is difficult 
to measure for users, vendors are unable to charge a premium for extra se-
curity due to the information asymmetry. Still the market for security 
products is very prosperous and is growing continuously (Bojanc & Jer-
man-Blazic, 2008).  
Cremomini and Nizovtsev (2009) developed a quantitative model based on 
game theory to understand information security practices. In their conclu-
sions they refer to Akerlof with: “This is consistent with existing theoreti-
cal research on economics of incomplete asymmetric information”. It is 
however not shown how their findings are consistent with a real lemon 
Market as described by Akerlof.  
Kim et al.(2010)  investigated customers‟ perceptions of security and trust 
in e-payment systems and found that posting security statements in e-
payment sites are likely to increase the chances of customers‟ purchasing 
and paying over the Internet. They argue that the basis for this proposition 
lays in the concept of information asymmetry and the role it plays in deci-
sion-making. The risk of leading to a lemon market  is recognized as one 
of major problems in e-payment systems.   
Brydon and Vining (2006) are bringing LMT in to show the failure of in-
ternal knowledge markets. They conclude that internal knowledge suppli-
ers must maintain their reputation to prevent suppliers of high-quality 
knowledge not participating in the internal knowledge market.  
In a research of creating business value by virtual communities, a type of 
virtual community is a transaction-oriented community where sellers and 
buyers are brought together like eBay. According to Spaulding (2010) 
transaction-oriented community becomes a lemon market when trust be-
tween the parties does not exist. Without trust, risk increases and prices 
deflates causing sellers with valuable goods to take their goods elsewhere.  
This is confirmed by a research on attacks and defense techniques for 
reputation systems (Hoffman et al. 2009). 
Devos et al. (2009) investigated the outsourcing of IS projects in SMEs 
(Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) and found that the LMT offers an 
extra explanation for the adverse selection. They show that there is always 
incentive for adverse selection as long as the SME-principal is not willing 
to pay the cost to fade out the information asymmetry and thus creating an 
ideal environment for a lemon market. The market where SMEs buy IT is 
attractive for small independent software vendors (ISV) acting as business 
partners of top notch ERP suppliers, like SAP, Oracle or Microsoft Dy-
namics or IS/IT suppliers like IBM, Hewlett-Packard or Apple. However, 
the capability maturity level of the ISVs is often inadequate to match with 
the demands and complex challenges of an IS implementation in an SME 
environment. Since SMEs are not so well informed on the correct IT/IS 
capabilities of the ISVs as well as on the broad functionalities of the pack-
age software together with the efforts needed to adapt the software to the 
specific requirements of the users, a situation of severe information asym-
metry occurs. They found that this leads almost always to opportunistic or 
even unethical behaviour on behalf of the ISV and that  a lemon market 
occurs.  
Eymann et al. (2008) apply LMT for Grid economies. Grid technologies 
are particular types of technological and organizational interactions within 
a computer network, describing supply and demand for computational and 
data services. Again a situation of information asymmetry occurs between 
the service providers having more information about availability and quali-
ty of the services they provide, and their users or clients. The asymmetri-
cally distributed information leads to uncertainty about the optimal use of 
the Grid on the client side and consequently to imperfect markets.  
Table 1 gives an overview of some IS articles using the LMT. The articles 
can also be found in the references.  In the first column with mentioned the 
author(s). The second column is the research domain. The most researched 
domains are: e-commerce, IT security and IT outsourcing.  The third col-
umn is the research topic which is a refinement of the research domain. 
The unit of analysis is shown in the fifth column and the sixth column 
shows the additional theories that are used in the article.  
Authors Research domain Research Topic Unit of analysis Used Theories 
Afzal et al. (2009) Information Product valuation Group of students  
Bojanc and Jerman-Blazic (2008) ICT security Risk management Organization  
Brydon and Vining (2006) Knowledge Management Internal market failure Organization  
Cremonini and Nizovtsev (2009) ICT security Strategic Attackers Security environment Game theory 
Devos et al. (2008) IT outsourcing IS failures SME ((small and medium-
sized organizations) 
Agency theory, Prospect theory, 
Trust theory, Incomplete Contract 
theory 
Devos et al. (2009) IT outsourcing Outsourced project management SME  Agency theory, Prospect theory, 
Trust theory, Incomplete Contract 
theory 
Dewan and Hsu (2004) e-Commerce Online Auction Markets  Auction theories 
Eymann (2008) IT/IS Grid environments Grid markets Trust 
Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan (2008) IT Outsourcing Offshore software developing Organisations  
Ghose (2009) e-Commerce Electronic trading of used goods Market of used goods  
Hoffman et al. (2009) ICT security Attack and defense techniques Organization Trust 
Kim et al. (2009) e-Commerce E-payment Markets Trust 
Lee et al. (2010) e-Commerce Online Auction fraud Markets Auction theories 
Lee and Yoo (2007) e-Commerce Electronic trading of physical 
goods 
Markets Auction theories 
Overby and Jap (2009) e-Commerce Adoption of e-channels Markets  
Pavlou and Gefen (2004) e-Commerce Online Auction and Institution-
Based trust 
Markets Trust 
Pavlou and Dimoka (2006) e-Commerce Online marketplaces and Trust and 
Reputation  
Markets Trust  
Pavlou et al. (2007) e-Commerce Buyer-seller relationships Consumers Agency Theory 
Spaulding (2010) Internet Virtual communities Organization Trust  
Snir and Hitt (2001) Information Economics Contracts Organization Agency Theory 
Whang (2010) Adoption of IT RFID Supply chain Diffusion and adoption  
Wilson and Zillante (2010) e-Commerce Institutional designs (Two-sided 
multilateral negotiations and post-
ed-offers)  
Markets  
Table 1 – Overview of IS articles using the Lemon Market theory
5 Bibliographical analysis of the original Akerlof article 
It was 40 years ago since Akerlof published his seminal article in the Quar-
terly Journal of Economics (Akerlof, 1970). So reviewing and profiling the 
existing literature citing this article is likely to be of use to researchers and 
practitioners. This will help to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the 
existing body of research and to provide clearness in the findings. Our ob-
jective therefore was to identify peer reviewed IS journals publishing ar-
ticles based on the LMT. We limited our research to work published in the 
database provided by Thompson Scientific also known as the Web of 
Science. 
As of the beginning of March 2010 the original Akerlof article was already 
cited more than 2200 times with a monthly growth of 15 – 20 newly citing 
publications (last access of the Web of Science database was end of June 
2010 and showed 2285 citations). In table 2 we show the number of citing 
articles by subject area. The subject areas are chosen to be most favorable 
to publish IS related work, however one cannot exclude that other areas al-
so publish such work. It is also well known that the IS discipline is far 
from mature and stable and has tentacles in a wide variety of referencing 
disciplines like business, economics, management and operational re-
search. IT/IS has penetrated in almost every academic field! 
 Subject Area Count Percentage 
Economics 824 51.08% 
Business 231 14.32% 
Business/Finance 184 11.41% 
Management 176 10.91% 
Law 130 8.06% 
Agricultural, Economics & Policy 67 4.15% 
Sociology 67 4,15% 
Planning & Development 48 2.98% 
Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods 47 2.91% 
Environmental Studies 46 2.85% 
Political Science 41 2.54% 
Public Administration 33 2.05% 
Information Science & Library Science 31 1.92% 
Environmental Science 30 1.86% 
Computer Sciences, Information Systems 29 1.80% 
Health Policy & Services 29 1.80% 
Health Care Sciences & Services 28 1.74% 
Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications 28 1.74% 
Operational Research & Management Science 26 1.61% 
Table 2 – Number of articles citing the seminal Akerlof article by subject area 
(date of inquiry: 25
th
 of March). 
 
The subject areas in the Web of Science are not treated as mutual exclusive 
attributes, so articles can be present in more than one subject area. We li-
mited our search to articles only and excluded proceeding papers, reviews, 
and editorial material. This left a total of 1613 refereed articles at the date 
of March 2010. We can observe in table 2 that the largest area is econom-
ics, being the originating area of the seminal Akerlof article, following by 
the derived disciplines business, finance and management.  
The largest area within the IS discipline is Information Science & Library 
Science with 1.92% of the total articles or 31 refereed articles, followed by 
Computer Science, Information Systems with 1.80% and 29 articles.  
Again, it is not easy to reveal IS research articles in the Web of Science by 
subject area.   
An alternative way to dig up IS research articles is done via a search by re-
levant IS journals, this is shown in table 3. A lot of IS scholars have their 
favorite IS journals, so a overview by journal title can be of interest. Again 
this alternative way gives only an indication and not a complete picture of 
the quantity of IS research articles citing the work of Akerlof, since a lot of 
IS research articles also are published in typical non-IS research journals 
like the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Management Science, and Or-
ganization Science.  
 
Journal Title Article 
count 
Percen-
tage 
Information Systems Research (ISR) 7 0.61% 
Decision Support Systems (DSS) 5 0.44% 
Communications of the ACM (CACM) 4 0.35% 
European Journal of Operational Research (EJOR) 4 0.35% 
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications  3 0.26% 
Information & Management (I&M) 3 0.26% 
Journal of Management Information Systems (JMIS) 3 0.26% 
MIS Quarterly (MISQ) 3 0.26% 
Industrial Management & Data Systems 2 0.17% 
Journal of Information Science 2 0.17% 
J. of Organizational Computing and Electronic Com-
merce 2 0.17% 
ACM Computing Surveys 1 0.09% 
Concurrency and Computation-Practice & Experience 1 0.09% 
IEEE Trans. on Knowledge And Data Engineering 1 0.09% 
Information Processing & Management 1 0.09% 
ACM Computing Surveys 1 0.09% 
Concurrency and Computation-Practice & Experience 1 0.09% 
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering 1 0.09% 
Information Processing & Management 1 0.09% 
Information Research and Resource Reports 1 0.09% 
Information Sciences 1 0.09% 
Intern. J. of Information Management 1 0.09% 
Intern. J. on Semantic Web and Information Systems 1 0.09% 
J. of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 1 0.09% 
Journal of Grid Computing 1 0.09% 
Online Information Review 1 0.09% 
Table 3 – Number of articles published in IS journals and citing the seminal Aker-
lof article.  
 The IS journal with the most citing articles is the Information Systems Re-
search with 7 articles, followed by Decision Support 5 articles, Communi-
cations of the ACM (4 articles) and the European Journal of Operational 
Research together (4 articles). Table 3 illustrates that the articles are spread 
over a large group of different journals.  The most publishing IS journals 
of work using the LMT lay within the basket of “pure MIS” journals: ISR 
(#7), DSS (#7), CACM (#4), MISQ (#3), (Rainer and Miller 2005). 
In figure 3 we shown the evolution of the number of articles published per 
year. As can be seen the number is incrementing every year and the growth 
is exponential. The last year taken into consideration, for  figure 3 was 
2009 with a total number of 116 articles referring to Akerlof‟s seminal 
work.  
 
Figure 3 – Number of articles published per year and referring to Akerlof’s seminal work. 
 
6 Conclusion 
We have shown that the work of Akerlof has been acknowledged in a va-
riety of disciplines including IS research. The lemon market is indeed a 
very frequent occurring phenomenon and has been applied by lot of scho-
lars from different academic perspectives. The theory goes back to the es-
sence of markets and human interactions. The emerging e-markets since 
the end of the last century has given a boost to the application of the 
theory. We have also shown that the theory has a much broader application 
domain than e-commerce.  
Since the LMT is a meta-theory with a very high level of abstraction it 
provides way of thinking about other theories and has also links to other 
theories. We show that Agency theory is one of them with probably the 
same strength and authority than the LMT. Prospect theory and the theory 
of organizational trust are also very strongly linked and can provide meas-
ures for constructs of the LMT. 
The scarcity of empirical evidence of the LMT in IS research is probably 
the major drawback. Although the theory has strong explanatory power, 
every empirical situation has its own specific nature which should be care-
fully and rigorously investigated. The relevance of the LMT lays in its 
nomological power to make strong generalizing laws.  
Finally we think that this chapter can help researcher to find adequate in-
formation on the LMT and we hope that it can be of use to new research 
initiatives in domains as described in this article.  
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